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Abstract
For more than a decade the Internet was confronted with ignorance and resistance in many 
European countries. National and European technology policies were unfavorable to “not invented 
here” technologies and committed to “open networks” of a different kind. The incumbent network 
operators in telecommunications, most of them enjoying a monopoly status for a long time, 
declined tolerating deviant modes of data communication and service provision, which might 
trigger competition and uncontrollable use of their networks. This situation was not simply a matter 
of attitudes and beliefs of the managerial and political élite. It was rather an expression of 
constraints of a traditional institutional setting which had produced industry structures and 
industrial policy strategies that were not compatible with the Internet. Only recently can we 
observe changes. Telecoms liberalization in the European Union and the emergence of market 
competition in this industry coincide with a new Internet policy that recognizes the infrastructural 
significance of this network for a European information society and the need to involve Internet 
users in order to exploit the potential of this network. 
Kurzfassung
Länger als ein Jahrzehnt ist das Internet in vielen Ländern Europas auf Ignoranz und Widerstand 
gestoßen. Die Technologiepolitik auf nationaler und Europäischer Ebene behinderte Technik, die 
nicht im eigenen Lande erfunden wurde, und war „offenen Netzen“ anderer Art verbunden. Die 
eingesessenen Telekommunikationsgesellschaften, von denen die meisten lange Zeit eine 
Monopolstellung innehatten, waren nicht bereit, ihnen „fremde“ Techniken und Dienste der 
Datenkommunikation zu tolerieren. Man befürchtete Wettbewerb und unkontrollierbare 
Netznutzung als deren Folge. Die Schwierigkeiten, die das Internet hatte, waren insgesamt nicht so 
sehr auf die ablehnende Haltung der politischen und unternehmerischen Elite zurückzuführen. 
Vielmehr hatten die traditionellen institutionellen Bedingungen mit dem Internet inkompatible 
industrielle Strukturen und industriepolitische Strategien hervorgebracht. Erst in den letzten Jahren 
zeichnen sich Veränderungen ab. Die Liberalisierung der Telekommunikation in der Europäischen 
Union und die Entstehung von Wettbewerbsmärkten in diesem Sektor fallen zeitlich mit einer 
Internetpolitik zusammen, die die infrastrukturelle Bedeutung dieses Netzes für die europäische 
Informationsgesellschaft und die Notwendigkeit der Nutzerbeteiligung zum Zwecke der optimalen 
Nutzung des Netzpotentials erkannt hat. 
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1 Introduction    
The Internet has had a hard time in Europe. Only in the second half of the 1990s, after a long period 
of ignorance and resistance, did Europeans gradually start to accept and use the network of networks. 
In this chapter I analyse the Internet's career in Europe. After providing a short sketch of the 
evolution of the Internet in the USA and an overview over the present state of its diffusion and 
utilization in Europe and the USA (2), I examine why it took so long before European policy makers 
realized the Internet's potential for innovation and economic growth. The central institutional 
obstacles to the Internet will be identified and policy failures evolving from this backdrop will be 
illustrated (3). I will then show that it required radical institutional change to open a window of 
opportunity for the Internet and unleash its dynamic potential (4). The last section (5) – followed by 
a short conclusion (6) – illustrates the contours of a new European Internet policy emerging from a 
changing institutional setting and a new user-oriented strategy to promote the Internet as the 
electronic backbone of a European information society.  
2 Evolution of the Internet and its present state in Europe   
As is well known, the Internet started as ARPANET – a network that served research and, to a minor 
degree, military purposes when it was launched by the US Department of Defense's (DoD) 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The pioneering Transmission Control Protocol/ 
Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol stack, which facilitates the interconnection of heterogeneous 
networks in a way that allows them to be used as if they were one single network, was implemented 
in the ARPANET at the end of 1982. In the same year, technical recommendations specifying the 
protocol details of crucial services, including electronic mail, were approved by informal governance 
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could be implemented free of charge by anybody who wanted to use it. In this sense TCP/IP was an 
open standard.(1)  
In 1985, the US National Science Foundation (NSF) became involved in research and education 
networking. The NSF initiated the NSFNET, a backbone network designed to provide both access to 
remote supercomputers and a test bed for experiments in data transmission and switching. Early on, 
the NSF officials responsible for the NSFNET also had in mind to create an encompassing multi-
purpose research and education network. Rather than opting for one of the existing proprietary 
standards for computer networks such as SNA or DECET, the NSF chose TCP/IP to be implemented 
in the NSFNET. In doing so, the NSF created a niche in which TCP/IP was sheltered from market 
competition and could develop into a mature protocol stack that attracted the development of 
complementary software for a variety of applications. University networks and other local area 
networks linking research organizations to one another could be connected to the NSFNET on the 
condition that they use TCP/IP as the interface standard.  
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With the advent of the World Wide Web (WWW) in the early 1990s, the research and education 
network exploded and started transforming itself into the commercially viable global Internet. Also 
in this case the non-proprietary, open nature of the basic protocol (HTTP) proved to be instrumental 
for the rapid diffusion of the WWW. In 1995 the NSF ceased operating the NSFNET. Today the 
Internet is owned and operated by private corporations, non-profit organizations and other collective 
entities. Internet service providers, telephone companies, cable television companies, computer 
hardware and software vendors, media companies and all kinds of firms that enter into electronic 
commerce use the Internet as a communications infrastructure and business channel.  
In summary, the network of networks appears to be well described by the label ‘the accidental 
superhighway,’ which was employed by The Economist magazine in July 1995. In its early stages 
the Internet was promoted and funded, but not designed, by the US government. In this sense, the 
Internet is a product of US science (and technology) policy. However, at no point in time did some 
kind of master-plan exist to guide the Internet’s evolution, even though there were critical decisions 
taken by public agencies that powerfully shaped the course of that evolution – such as the NSF 
decision to implement the TCP/IP protocol in the NSFNET, and the subsequent decision to privatise 
the NSFNET backbone.  
At the time The Economist coined the phrase of ‘the accidental superhighway’ the Internet was not a 
well-known phenomenon in Europe. Today, some six years later, the network of networks is well 
established in the member states of the European Union. From 1996 to 2001, the number of hosts in 
the so-called ccTLDs (country code Top-Level Domains) grew from 1.9 million in January 1996 to 
5.0 million in January 1998, to 9.5 million in January 2000 and to some 13.7 million in January 2001 
at constantly very high growth rates.(2) However, the absolute number of hosts (Figure 1) as well as 
the density of hosts per country (Figure 2) varies considerably in different parts of Europe. The 
number of hosts per 1,000 inhabitants is much lower in Southern than in Northern Europe.  
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
Figure 3 
We find a similar picture if we look at the percentage of people with Internet access in Figure 3, 
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Netherlands have the highest penetration rates. In an encompassing report for the European 
Commission, the telecommunications consultants Fischer & Lorenz argue that ‘cultural differences, 
language barriers, income levels and the general lack of IT infrastructure (such as PCs)’ account for 
the imbalances in Europe. The consultants also emphasize that ‘Europe is generally behind North 
America in Internet development’ (Fischer & Lorenz 2000, pp. 6–8). Figure 3 shows that, compared 
with 28 % of the Europeans, 48 % of the Americans have Internet access. At the time the report was 
finalized the differences between Europe and the USA were even more significant. In November 
1999 the total number of Internet users world-wide was estimated at 201 million: 101 million (or 
35% of the population) in the USA and 43 million (or 12 %) in Europe (Fischer & Lorenz 2000, p. 
28)(3). Apparently the gap between Europe and the USA is narrowing although Europe still lags 
behind. The reasons for this delay date back to inadequate strategic action and a lack of appropriate 
incentives in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
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3 Obstacles to the diffusion of the Internet in Europe   
Trying to detect why the Internet has had difficulties in Europe, we can rule out the suggestion that it 
was a lack of inventiveness that accounts for these difficulties.  
3.1 No lack of European inventiveness   
Among the pioneering technical inventions which facilitated the evolution of the Internet were 
packet switching, the TCP/IP protocol stack and what we today call the World Wide Web (WWW). 
All these innovations were invented or co-invented in Europe (Figure 4).  
Figure 4  
Packet switching describes a switching and transmission technology which splits complete messages 
into small packets. These packets can be transmitted along different lines of a network (in a store-
and-forward mode), and they are re-assembled into the original message by the receiving host when 
they reach their final destination. In the middle of the 1960s packet switching was invented 
simultaneously by Paul Baran at the RAND corporation in the United States and Donald Davies at 
the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in England.(4) While Baran's ideas became one of the 
technical foundations of the Internet's forerunner ARPANET, Davies' proposals to base a new 
network on packet switching was rejected by the British General Post Office, which at the time also 
operated the public telephone network. Davies' own organization, the NPL, did not have the 
resources and the authority to build such a network. A smaller restricted network (called Mark I) 
sponsored by the NPL was started in 1967 but developed slowly. It came to be used by researchers at 
the NPL but did not have the impact that the ARPANET had in the USA (Abbate 1999, pp. 7–41).  
TCP/IP, the protocol stack which constitutes the technical basis of the network of networks because 
it facilitates the interconnection of technically heterogeneous networks, was developed by Robert 
Kahn and Vinton Cerf at ARPA. It was presented to the public for the first time in 1973. The 
protocol, among other functions, sets up connections between hosts and provides reliable 
transmission of data packets in diverse environments as far as design and basic protocols of networks 
are concerned. The packets transmitted are called datagrams. They can be compared with envelopes 
which transport all kinds of binary data (including voice or video) across a network. Each datagram 
contains the address of its destination – whether it is a traditional host or a personal computer 
desktop. This allows for what the experts call connectionless transmission. Datagrams are handed 
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final receiver before the transmission process starts. Thus, using datagrams, interconnecting different 
networks is not very demanding. Long before datagram transmission technology was employed in 
the ARPANET, it was used in an experimental network project in France called Cyclades. Funded 
by the French government and invented by Louis Pouzin and Hubert Zimmerman, Cyclades had 
been explicitly designed to facilitate internetworking. TCP/IP reflects the design of Cyclades. Pouzin 
and Zimmerman struggled to convince France Telecom, the French public (monopoly) 
telecommunications carrier, to employ datagram transmission in the public data network (Abbate 
1999, p. 123–127). However, France Telecom and most other European telephone administrations 
(PTTs) opted for another, a connection-oriented, technology, which emerged in 1974 and was later 
adopted as an international standard (X.25) by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). 
X.25 networks are homogeneous and more centralized than TCP/IP networks. Their architecture 
parallels that of the public switched telephone networks (Schmidt and Werle 1998). X.25 technology 
cannot be used to interconnect networks with different basic protocols.  
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Finally we turn to the World Wide Web (WWW), which provides another, well-known, Internet-
related example of European inventiveness. Initially, one drawback of using the Internet was the 
difficulty of locating and retrieving online information. At the beginning of the 1990s a service 
called the Gopher system was developed at the University of Minnesota. However, Gopher like other 
hierarchical systems of information representation was very soon outperformed by the WWW. Its 
foundation was laid by Tim Berners-Lee and Robert Cailliau at CERN, the European Particle 
Physics Laboratory, in 1990 (Berners-Lee and Fischetti 1999). Since the early 1980s CERN used 
TCP/IP as the common protocol for its various networks. Berners-Lee created a hypertext system 
(hypertext markup language, HTML), which could handle different data formats and which would 
run on TCP/IP (using the hypertext transfer protocol, HTTP). An addressing scheme was employed 
(uniform resource locator, URL) for locating files on the Internet. CERN made the software 
available on the Internet but did not regard it as lying within its responsibility to promote further 
development of this technology towards commercial viability. In 1993 the basic ideas were taken up 
by the National Center for Supercomputer Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois, which 
obviously had no problem integrating WWW-related activities into its work programme although 
they had nothing in common with supercomputer applications. Marc Andreessen and his colleagues 
developed a web browser called Mosaic. In 1994, Andreessen left NCSA to set up his own company 
Netscape. In the same year Tim Berners-Lee left CERN to join the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) and become director of the World Wide Web Consortium, which was affiliated to 
the MIT (Dertouzos 1998, pp. 3–54). Today (April 2001) the Consortium, which develops and 
adopts web standards, has over 500 member organizations including all relevant players in the 
computer, telecommunications and Internet industry.  
3.2 Telecommunications monopolies  
The examples of packet switching, TCP/IP (datagram) protocols and the World Wide Web 
demonstrate that Europe did not lag behind the US in terms of inventiveness. Yet, the first two 
examples in particular indicate that the institutional opportunity structure of European 
telecommunications was unfavourable to these kinds of innovations at the time they were invented. 
Organizations enjoying a monopoly status either were not interested in packet switching – as in the 
case of the British General Post Office – or were committed to X.25 rather than datagram-based 
packet switching – as in the case of France Telecom. Both organizations may have had good reasons 
for their choices, but their monopoly position left no room for other organizations to take up the 
innovations and develop them into attractive software products.  
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countries at the time the Internet started to gain a standing as a research and education network in the 
USA. Here competition prevailed in the telecommunications industry. Concerning data 
communication services, for instance, several competing providers of so-called value-added 
networks such as Telenet, Tymnet, CompuServe and GE-Information Services served companies and 
later in the 1980s also the general public providing dialup and leased-line connections. After the 
divestiture of AT&T in the early 1980s, also the Bell Operating Companies striving for new 
commercial opportunities entered the market for data services. Many of them also got involved in 
funding and building regional research and education networks in collaboration with universities and 
state and local authorities (Mandelbaum and Mandelbaum 1996). Although it was promoted by 
federal government agencies the Internet was not uncontested either. Several research and education 
networks based either on proprietary or on open standards, but not on TCP/IP, competed with or 
complemented the Internet. One of these networks was BITNET – a co-operative university network 
which was based on IBM technology (VNET). In the first half of the 1980s more universities were 
connected to the BITNET than to the Internet. This network directs our attention to another example 
of European constraints on networks outside the PTT domains.  
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BITNET's European sister was EARN – the European Academic and Research Network. The IBM 
Corporation launched and sponsored EARN in the early 1980s. The network was welcomed by the 
research community. In the mid-1980s more than 500 computers in the research organizations of 19 
countries were linked to EARN. This was only possible after the European telecommunications 
monopolies – for the first time in history – had accepted data transmission across national borders 
along private lines. The EARN board of directors had to struggle hard to secure the permission for 
this. This included problems with governments, among them the German government, which only 
gave the green light on the condition that EARN evolve in a system based on open systems standards 
as defined by the official international standardization organizations (OSI standards, see below). The 
German position reflected a widespread governmental concern, shared by the European 
Commission, that EARN might be part of IBM’s strategy to expand market dominance, to which 
some substance was lent by the fact that initially only IBM mainframes and Digital Equipment’s Vax 
computers could be linked via EARN. The open systems standards requirement for EARN was 
conceded by the board of directors, but in the event it never came to be implemented.  
The German government, like other governments, reacted to EARN through initiating a national 
science network. This was in line with government programmes to support the German computer 
industry and the national champion Siemens. Also the European Union reacted. In 1986 it set up 
RARE (Réseaux Associés pour la Récherche Européenne) to promote coordination of national 
operators of science networks and fund network-related R&D projects with the ultimate goal of 
stimulating the development of a European data network. One strategic component – controlled by 
RARE with the European Commission acting as project coordinator – was COSINE (Cooperation 
for Open Systems Interconnection Networking in Europe). COSINE’s aim was to create an 
international packet-switched network for researchers based on the X.25 standard.(5)  
3.3 Failed standards policy   
Technical standards played a strategic role in the area of science networks, public data networks and 
in the European computer industry. The central focus was on the already mentioned OSI standards. 
OSI, the Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model, was adopted as an international standard 
in 1984. OSI's seven-layer protocol architecture was meant to provide a reference system for 
defining inter-networking protocols and coordinating the standardization of data communications 
systems. It was the product of an engineering programme that was organized mainly in Europe. The 
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whose members were industry consortia, voluntary standards-development organizations and 
government agencies that were committed to OSI with regard to realizing the vision of universal 
non-discriminatory access to communications via a global network. The design, standardization and 
public procurement of information and communication technology should pave the way for a truly 
open non-proprietary network (Schmidt and Werle 1998).  
For some participants in the movement the principle of non-discriminatory open standards had a 
rationale beyond that of an open global network. European computer vendors, European 
governments and, in particular, the Commission of the European Union saw the OSI programme also 
as an instrument of industrial policy to protect the European manufacturers against US competition – 
especially since many US vendors were already well entrenched as the dominant vendors of 
proprietary network solutions for business. OSI was specifically intended to arrest the widespread 
deployment of IBM’s SNA network standard in Europe (Werle 1997).  
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In the second half of the 1980s, also the US government officially declared that it would switch to 
OSI with regard to its procurement policy. The Department of Commerce (DoC) and the National 
Bureau of Standards (NBS) promoted OSI, but they also accepted other standards as long as OSI 
products were not available. In the American Internet community TCP/IP was obviously preferred to 
OSI. Criticism tended to be levelled against the poor technical performance of specific standards. 
Strong opposition was focused on X.25, the already mentioned international standard for connection-
oriented packet-switched networks. Being essentially a pre-OSI standard, X.25 was incorporated into 
OSI, but it could not be used to interconnect heterogeneous networks. Internet enthusiasts never 
adopted an explicitly favourable stance towards OSI. In the eyes of many observers the battle 
between the partisans of TCP/IP and OSI network protocols degenerated into a ‘religious 
war’ (Drake 1993). In this war the European commitment to OSI did not tolerate any ‘deviant’ 
activity (Malamud 1993). Computer scientists could not expect to receive public funding for TCP/IP-
related research. The US government, in contrast, took a more pragmatic stance, in particular after it 
became apparent that many of the hopes focusing on OSI were to be disappointed because it was 
taking extremely long until OSI products appeared on the market – too late for OSI to be regarded as 
a serious competitor to TCP/IP.  
The European Commission and many European governments did not promote the Internet and 
TCP/IP until the increasing commercial viability of this network of networks made acceptance of 
this innovation inevitable. Until this official change of mind, TCP/IP had only been used in private 
networks with the exception of the so-called European Backbone (EBONE) – a hybrid network with 
regard to standards and funding. Launched in 1992 with many promoters in Northern Europe and in 
the Netherlands, EBONE was a multi-protocol network, which included TCP/IP and was partly 
funded by RARE. The early openness of the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands towards 
TCP/IP accounts for the leading position of these countries with regard to Internet penetration and 
use (see above: Figures 2 and 3).  
In summary, the European standards policy towards OSI on the part of the EU Commission and of 
many governments turned out to be a failure. The tendency to keep up a strong commitment to OSI 
without considering the prospects of TCP/IP account to some degree for the fact that Europe is 
significantly behind the USA in Internet diffusion and utilization.  
3.4 Fragmented industrial policy   
European standards policy evolved in an institutional setting that was shaped by a weak and 
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telecommunications services and a comparatively strong telecommunications manufacturing industry 
that to some degree relied on sheltered national home markets. Technology policy and standards 
policy was industrial policy – and it was nationally fragmented. European policy fragmentation and 
concomitant barriers to trade also account indirectly for the problems European policy makers had 
accepting – let alone promoting – the Internet.  
One of the most spectacular examples of fragmented and parochial technology policy in Europe can 
be found in an area where telecommunications, data processing and TV broadcasting overlapped. It 
focused on what was called ‘interactive videotex’ in the terminology of the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU). In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, almost simultaneously, 
telecommunications operators in the United Kingdom, France and Germany, as well as in the USA, 
Canada, Japan and a few other countries, planned and heavily promoted an information service for 
the public with a potential for professional application. Some functions were similar to the Internet – 
though at the time, of course, not as sophisticated. The system was called Prestel in the UK, 
Bildschirmtext in Germany and Télétel/Minitel in France.  
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In contrast with the efforts in the other countries, the French undertaking not only achieved the status 
of an industrial grand projet with an extremely high degree of concerted political and industrial 
action but also turned out to be a success at the national level. Télétel, however, never developed into 
a transnational or global system. The other European systems did not even take off within their 
national confines. Each country followed the strategy of exporting the system to other countries 
while keeping the national market closed. For the actors involved, future market shares in a global 
market were tied to getting their standard accepted as the single world standard for interactive 
videotex. But they never achieved consensus, neither internationally nor at the regional European 
level (Schmidt and Werle 1998, pp. 147-184). In an open European market without 
telecommunications monopolies, interactive videotex might have developed into a successful 
European service with national variants on a common technical platform. In terms of the market, 
Télétel demonstrated early on that European consumers were prepared to buy information and 
transaction services on screen. Before the Internet started to gain ground in France the Télétel system 
had more than six million private and business subscribers and had created many new jobs, directly 
and indirectly.  
4 Breaking institutional barriers   
The last section illustrated that it was not a lack of inventiveness, but rather the institutional "lock in" 
in monopolistic structures and the fragmented national industrial policy, combined with policy 
failure in an area of standardization where a European consensus was achieved, that to a high degree 
accounts for the delayed and slow development of the Internet in Europe. Some of the institutional 
barriers to the Internet have been removed but, as will be examined now, some obstacles have 
remained.  
The inherited telecommunications regime is suspected of having posed a serious obstacle to the 
diffusion of the Internet. Only since 1998 are the markets for telecommunications services and 
networks open to competition in most of the member states of the European Union. It took a long 
time to deregulate and liberalize telecommunications if we consider that the first crucial step towards 
liberalization and deregulation was taken with the European Commission's 1987 Green Paper on 
telecommunications. It marked the starting point of a long series of directives, communications and 
reports, all of which brought about the largest liberalized telecommunications market in the world. 
As a result, in countries such as Germany the rates have gone down dramatically, in particular for 
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On the side of the EU Commission, telecommunications policy was initiated and driven by the goal 
of liberalization and market integration according to the Internal Market Programme (1982) and the 
Single European Act (1986), though industrial policy concerns also played a role. From this 
perspective a common market without any internal barriers to trade would be instrumental as a home 
base for European conglomerates to improve their respective positions in the export markets 
(Schneider and Werle 1990). Early on, telecommunications was regarded as being part of the 
information technology industry. Therefore early technology-focused programmes such as ESPRIT 
(European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information Technology, 1984) 
and RACE (Research and Development in Advanced Communications Technologies in Europe, 
1987) embraced both communication and information technology. They aimed at promoting trans-
European and cross-sectoral collaboration. Both programmes had a strong bias towards large private 
corporations (the Big Twelve) and the operators of public telecommunications networks. RACE had 
a strong infrastructural component. The ultimate goal of the RACE projects funded by the EU was to 
facilitate integrated broadband communication. In this context, the promotion of ISDN (Integrated 
Services Digital Network) and of European standards played an important role. From the point of 
view of Internet diffusion in Europe, the plan to modernize and expand the telecom infrastructure 
appears to be a helpful step. However, in the 1980s the European technology programs in effect 
created a technology push without an equivalent user-oriented demand pull.  
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In the early 1990s, therefore, the Commission tried to gear its policy to a comprehensive model, 
which we can call the old Information Society Approach. Building on the Commission's 1993 White 
Paper on growth and competitiveness (the Delors paper), the so-called Bangemann Report (1994) 
specifies this approach deemed necessary to guide Europe's transition to an information society. The 
report mimics components of the 1993 US national information infrastructure initiative (NII) but 
carefully avoids referring to the Internet, which is only mentioned in passing, whereas the American 
initiative is modelled on the Internet and its governance structure (CSTB 1994; Kahin 1997). 
Another difference is that the action plan of the Clinton/Gore administration left more activities to 
private initiative and the market than it did in the past, while the Bangemann report calls for public 
‘assistance’ in ten exemplary areas (including a network for universities and research centres) where 
uncoordinated market forces alone might fail to reach a critical mass of users. The information 
society's need for an efficient and internationally competitive telecommunications infrastructure had 
already been emphasized in the Commission's White Paper, which tends to regard provision of 
infrastructure as the responsibility of the public sector because markets might not provide them in 
the politically desired manner. This has found an expression in the TEN (Trans-European Networks) 
programme (McGowan 1993), which originally included an ambitious investment plan but later was 
cut back to a number of voluntary agreements among member states of the EU. An important 
element of TEN is the provision of telecommunications infrastructure in peripheral regions of the EU 
to which markets might not actually deliver what is needed. Other elements focus on Advanced 
Communications Technologies and Services (ACTS) in continuation of RACE (Fuchs and Werle 
1993). They include ISDN and integrated broadband communication, in particular ATM 
(Asynchronous Transfer Mode) technology.  
The old Information Society Approach was affected by the dawn of telecommunications 
liberalization. The incumbent network operators were preparing for market competition and hesitated 
to commit themselves to infrastructure programmes whose commercial viability was insecure. 
Moreover, while the approach included an attempt to align the projects to market demand and 
involve users, this often only occurred after the projects were launched. This is why observers from 
the USA applauded this approach as "a step in the right direction" but at the same time criticized it as 
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More often than not the critical remarks explicitly referred European policy makers to the Internet, 
which for a long time – perhaps too long a time – remained in the background as a kind of hidden 
agenda.  
However, if we inquire into the merits of the old Information Society Approach, two points must be 
stressed. The first is that the European Commission and the Council started to promote this concept 
earlier than most European governments, which triggered similar programmes in the member states 
(Chatrie and Wraight 2000). Germany, for instance, followed two years after the Bangemann Report 
with the policy plan ‘Info 2000: Deutschlands Weg in die Informationsgesellschaft’ (Germany's Way 
to the Information Society). The second point is that the Commission managed to convince 
corporations and governments to abandon national egotism and parochial policy and to establish a 
supranational telecommunications regime (Sandholtz 1998).  
5 Towards European Internet policy   
The European Summit in Lisbon in March 2000 endorsed the Commission's eEurope proposal which 
aims at ‘bringing every citizen, home and school, every business and administration into the digital 
age and online’ (COM (99) 687). At last with this endorsement – exactly three years after an Internet 
Advisory Group stressed the Internet's ‘truly enormous influence on all citizens of the Union and on 
the implementation of the Single Market’ and advised the Commission and the Council to get 
involved in these developments ‘very significantly’(6) – a period came to an end which was 
characterized by considerable passive ignorance and initially even active resistance towards the 
Internet and the underlying TCP/IP protocol technology. Early European attention to the Internet 
appeared to be drawn by risks rather than opportunities. In a communication of 1996 the 
Commission deals with ‘Illegal and harmful content on the Internet’ (COM (96) 487). A 
complementary Green Paper ‘On the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual and 
Information Services’ issued in the same year examines the challenges that society faces in the light 
of the Internet.  
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The Commission's reaction to the problems is critical but balanced insofar as not only the risks but 
also the opportunities of the Internet are stressed. However, although the Internet Advisory Group 
recommended participating rather than fence sitting in the process of Internet diffusion, European 
policy makers remained relatively passive. The Commission, for instance, initially played a marginal 
role in the process of reorganization of Internet naming and addressing – a central issue with regard 
to techno-economic governance of the network of networks. When, in 1997, the US Department of 
Commerce issued a Request for Comments concerning the future role of governmental and non-
governmental organizations in this area after privatisation of the Internet, the Commission’s response 
unveiled a lack of detailed knowledge about naming and addressing procedures. Thus, the 
Commission only emphasized the need to establish an internationally recognized transparent system 
and to ensure adequate European representation.(7) Eventually the private non-profit Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which guides and oversees registration, 
was set up perfectly in line with the US government initiative to exclude international organizations 
such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) from governing the Internet and leave it to 
private sector self-regulation. The Commission could live with the latter but heavily criticized the 
exclusion of intergovernmental bodies with the effect that a Governmental Advisory Committee 
(GAC) to the ICANN board of directors was established (Leib 2002).(8) This minor success of 
European interest policy in the process of reorganization of Internet techno-economic governance 
indicates that the Commission was not very well prepared to become involved in Internet-related 
issues. The Commission's relative indifference towards the institutionalisation of the naming and 
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in the EU. The registrars, which need an ICANN accreditation, assign names and numbers 
competitively. If we look into ICANN's list of accredited registrars we find only 34 EU, compared to 
89 US, firms (Figure 5).  
Figure 5 
In the context of the debate on Internet governance, the EU realized the growing significance of this 
network. Digital technologies were seen as the key factor for growth and employment and in 1998, 
in a Communication of the Commission, the Internet was acknowledged – if somewhat reluctantly - 
to be the principal infrastructure for electronic communications (COM (98) 111). In particular, issues 
related to electronic commerce have evoked the Commission's and the Council's engagement. In 
December 1999, the Commission launched its eEurope initiative, in which the Internet is qualified as 
the backbone of the European information society (COM (99) 687). It was endorsed by the European 
Summit only four months later.  
The recent effort to establish a .eu Internet Top-Level Domain (TLD) complementary to the national 
TLDs is more than just a symbolic action.(9) It signals Europe's presence in a network whose 
technical specifications, functions and services have to a considerable degree been shaped by the 
users and by small firms – a striking difference to the traditional telecommunications networks. 
From this angle the .eu-effort relates to other activities geared at increasing user involvement, such 
as the Information Society Technologies (IST) programme, which provides funds for research, 
development and demonstration projects towards a ‘User-friendly information society’.(10)  
A series of regulatory actions aimed at enabling or accelerating electronic commerce fits into this 
picture. They include digital signature, encryption, intellectual property and privacy issues. None of 
these problems is trivial, and it is also an open question whether EU-regulation, self-regulation, 
public-private co-regulation or no regulation at all turns out to be the most appropriate. Adequate 
answers require a broader participation of those involved in the provision and use of the Internet. 
The number of actors who are either interested or have a stake in the Internet is growing at a fast rate 
in Europe. We can observe that in the EU policy arena, which has become more open to Internet-
specific issues, an Internet policy domain is evolving which will provide appropriate collective 
responses to the ‘regulatory needs’ of electronic commerce and other Internet areas. In the USA such 
an Internet policy domain has already achieved an autonomous status vis-à-vis the 
telecommunications or the media domain. The set of corporate or collective actors in the Internet 
domain includes technology vendors, network operators, service providers, business interest 
organizations, consortia and forums of technical and organizational coordination, in addition to civil 
rights groups, funding organizations, government agencies and parliamentary committees, to say 
nothing of the diverse mailing and discussion groups with a genuine Internet base (Werle 2000). 
Similar trends can be detected in Europe. One indication is the emerging European network of an 
association representing the Internet service providers (ISPs) (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6  
Ten national Internet Service Providers Associations (ISPAs) with a constituency of up to 221 
members (in Germany) are members of the EuroISPA. Compared to other associations, EuroISPA is 
still a small organization. Considering, however, that some other associations also represent ISPs, 
both nationally and at the European level, this development provides evidence of a multifarious 
process of interest formation and the constitution of an Internet policy domain.  
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pivotal infrastructure of the information society. Therefore accommodating the institutional 
environment in a way that promises the greatest benefit of this network is a common desire. 
Organizations rooted in the US Internet domain struggle to keep away regulatory impositions 
stemming from the telecommunications or the media domain. Similar problems are encountered by 
the actors in the European Internet domain. The problems are aggravated by the domain's somewhat 
transient state. The question remains open as to whether the European domain has already achieved 
self-sufficiency.(11) Its stability and leverage will grow first and foremost to the extent that barriers 
to access to the Internet are removed. Widespread access will also mark a crucial step towards a 
European information society.  
There can be no doubt that the high cost of Internet usage including data transmission is still a 
significant barrier to access. The European Commission's eEurope Progress Report stresses the 
negative correlation of Internet access cost and penetration (COM (2000) 130). Consequently, in an 
eEurope Action Plan issued by the Commission in June 2000 several actions are proposed to provide 
cheaper (and faster) Internet access.(12) Most effective in terms of cost reduction has been the 
deregulation and liberalization of telecommunications in Europe. Ongoing monitoring of this process 
through the EU Commission helps spur on liberalization. It appears likely that in the near future 
Internet access providers are going to offer flat rates instead of charging for time, as has been one of 
the prevalent features of the traditional business model of the telephone network operators.  
If, in order to catch up with the USA, Internet usage is to be increased within a relatively short 
period of time and if a ‘digital divide’ within the European society is to be avoided, the EU will have 
to address other barriers to entry to the Internet such as computer illiteracy and lack of public access 
to the network in peripheral regions. In the USA, where a comparatively extensive understanding of 
the universal service concept prevails, we find, for instance, ‘E-rate’ and other federal programmes 
which, in combination with a series of public and private initiatives at the state and the local level, 
promote Internet access. They aim at connecting all schools and libraries to the Internet and 
providing training and technical support – thereby imparting the required competence for the use of 
the new medium. Some of the American efforts are copied others are debated by the Europeans. 
They embody elements of a new Information Society Approach which is not only passively open to 
the Internet but evolves from and actively takes up the needs, preferences and interests articulated in 
the European Internet policy domain. In the new approach the user plays a more prominent and 
active role than in the earlier European efforts.  
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6 Conclusion   
The Internet’s diffusion in Europe is significantly below the level of the United States. But it is not a 
lack of inventiveness with regard to computer, telecommunications and software technology that 
explains the European difficulties to catch up with the USA. Rather institutional barriers and policy 
failure account for the fact that Europeans lost valuable time to convert inventions into marketable 
products and gain experience with the development and use of components of the Internet. In the 
second half of the 1980s and in the early 1990s when the TCP/IP protocol stack established itself in 
the landscape of computer networks in the USA, European computer scientists and software 
engineers were confronted with virtually unsurmountable resistance if they tried to mobilize funds 
for Internet related development projects in the public as well as in the private sector of most 
countries. In this period public agencies and private corporations in the member states of the 
European Union – usually unwilling to coordinate industrial policy and strategy with each other – 
were united concerning their goal to counterattack the US predominance in information technology 
including computer networks. Guided by the European Commission they saddled the wrong horse 
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favourable conditions for the Internet have evolved, triggered by  
l institutional changes in particular in the European telecommunications industry,  
l a growing sense of the Internet’s infrastructural significance  
l and – as a result of a painful learning process – a reorientation of European technology policy 
towards user involvement and the requirements of competitive markets.  
However, given the well known technological and organizational lock-in effects with network 
technologies (Shapiro and Varian 1999), the legacy of the past which accounts for the time lag and 
accordingly the competitive disadvantage of European corporations in the area of computer networks 
and network services will not be overcome in the near future.  
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25.06.01 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-007.htm(1) This also indicates the in most parts civilian nature of the ARPANET. “The Internet grew out of 
the Department of Defense’s need to interconnect its various research networks” (Norberg and 
O’Neill 1996, pp. 193, 194; see also Leib and Werle 1998). ARPA has been an agency “that is really 
charged with civilian technological innovation but hides its mission behind the smoke screen of 
national defense interests” (Kitschelt 1991, p. 489).  
(2) Country codes are standardized by the International Standardization Organization (ISO). 
Examples of national domains are .nl for the Dutch, .de for the German or .it for the Italian Top-
Level Domain. By far the largest number of hosts (about 44 million) is registered in the global .com 
domain. But also the global .net domain includes 32 million host registrations. The .us, .gov, .edu, 
.mil domains can be regarded as national US domains. They comprise about 12.8 million hosts (all 
figures as of January 2001).  
(3) In the late 1990s, according to different sources, the Internet penetration rate was highest in the 
USA (estimations vary from 34% to 42%) and in the Scandinavian member states of the EU, in 
particular in Sweden (estimations vary from 42% to 52%). In Germany and the UK between 11% 
and 17% were estimated to have access whereas the penetration rate in Spain varied between 5% and 
7%. The EU average was estimated between 8.5% and 12%.  
(4) “Davies initially developed his ideas without any knowledge of Baran’s work” (Norberg and 
O’Neill 1996, p. 161). One of the goals – but neither the only nor the most important goal – of 
RAND’s research and development activities in the first half of the 1960s was “devising a 
communications system that could survive an enemy attack” (ibid., p. 160).  
(5) The very first European activity to set up a European Informatics Network (EIN) dates back to 
the early 1970s. EIN was designed to promote computer science and provide a test bed for 
networking techniques rather than offering communications services.  
(6) http://www.cordis.lu/esprit/src/i2eurepo.htm  
(7) http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/email/late.htm 
(8) However, the US government insisted that the role of governmental and intergovernmental 
organizations should be strictly limited to advisory functions 
(http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm).  
(9) ICANN agreed in principal to delegate jurisdiction on this domain to the EU.  
(10) The IST programme (1998–2002) is part of the Fifth Framework Programme. It has an initial 
budget of 3.6 billion EURO. See http://www.cordis.lu/ist/home.html  
(11) In a recent report on impact and priorities of the eEurope initiative the European Commission 
stressed that ‘the Internet sector is now big enough to exert an influence on the entire 
economy’ (COM (2001) 140; March 2001).  
(12) http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/docs/policy/docs/e_europe/action_plan_june_en.doc  
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Internet Host Count - January 2001 
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Development of Hosts per 1,000 Inhabitants: 1996-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seite 2 von 5 EIoP: Text 2001-007: Tables
25.06.01 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-007t.htmFigure 3 
Internet Penetration in EU Homes (%) - October 2000 
 
Figure 4 
Pioneering Inventions in Computer Networking 
 
EUROPE USA
PACKET-
SWITCHING 
First half of the 1960s 
Donald Davies 
National Physical Laboratory, 
United Kingdom 
Paul Baran 
RAND Corporation 
DATAGRAM 
TECHNOLOGY 
(TCP/IP) 
First half of the 1970s 
Louis Pouzin/ 
Hubert Zimmerman 
  
Cyclade Project, France 
Vinton Cerf/ 
Robert Kahn 
  
Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA) 
WORLD WIDE 
WEB 
(WWW) 
Early 1990s 
Tim Barners-Lee/ 
Robert Calliau 
European Particle Physics 
Laboratory (CERN) 
Marc Andreessen 
  
National Center for Supercomputing 
Applications (NCSA) 
Later: NETSCAPE Corporation 
 
 
Seite 3 von 5 EIoP: Text 2001-007: Tables
25.06.01 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-007t.htmFigure 5 
Internet Domain Name Registrars 
Source: ICANN (April 04, 2001). Only generic Top Level Domains (.com; .net; .org) 
Figure 6 
European and National Internet Service Providers 
Associations 
(*question marks indicate: no membership data available) 
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